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Activists and Corporate Behavior 
in Food Processing and Retailing: 
A Sequential Bargaining Game 
Darren Hudson and Jayson Lusk 
This study examines the strategic interaction between food companies and activists 
using a game theoretic model of sequential bargaining in the absence of  complete 
information. In a rather confined set of circumstances, findings indicate it is always 
in the best interest of  the food company to comply with activists' demands. More 
frequently, however, there will be cases where compliance is not optimal, depending 
on the size of the expected effect of protest, cost of defending against protest, and the 
cost of protest to the activist. 
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Introduction 
You are the CEO of McDonalds. An activist group has given you an ultimatum that 
if  you do not increase the size of your chicken pens in laying houses, they willprotest 
your  company  through  demonstrations  and  television  advertisements. A public 
campaign against you might be  costly to market share and brand equity. You don't 
know whether the group is willing or able to sustain a campaign against you, or 
whether they are trying to bluff  you into doing what they want. What do you do? 
Activism, as defined by critical writings, advertising, protesting, or boycotts, for example, 
has been an important part of American culture (Friedman, 1985).  Activists represent 
the opinions of at  least some portion of the  general population (Lohmann, 1991)  and 
attempt to use their moral mandate to influence corporate or government behavior. 
Evidence suggests an  increasing importance of activists through either  direct action 
(Ayers, 2000) or through pressure on institutional investors (Gillan and Starks, 2000; 
Kang, 2000). 
The increasing pressure on corporate entities by activists (Kapstein,  2001) has led to 
at least some modification in corporate behavior ranging from simple corporate apolo- 
gies for behavior (Belsie, 2000) to apparent preemptive moves to satisfy activists (Cook, 
2000; Shepard, Betz, and O'Connell, 1997).  Recent examples from the  food industry pro- 
vide some context for the problem. 
The People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) recently targeted McDonalds 
and Burger King for purchasing eggs from producers who, in their view, did not offer 
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sufficiently large pens for proper animal movement (along with issues regarding 
handling practices). Both McDonalds and Burger King acquiesced to PETA's demands 
without much effort on the part of PETA to stage demonstrations, despite the consider- 
ations that (a)  this action would increase the restaurant chains' cost structure for eggs 
(Smith, 2001), and (b)  increased cost likely could not be passed along to consumers with- 
out  loss of market share. Publicly released financial records reveal that McDonalds had 
about $40 billion in sales in 2001. At the same time, PETA's 2001 budget was $13 million. 
How does a $13 million entity force a $40 billion entity to change behavior? 
This problem goes beyond the McDonalds versus PETA example. All manner of 
activist groups with different agendas engage food companies every year. For example, 
Greenpeace protested NovartisIGerber's apparent use of genetically modified soy 
products in baby foods after a promise to discontinue the practice (Greenpeace, 2001). 
As both Hoffman (2002) and Hammonds (2002) have pointed out, this engagement 
between activists and food companies is one of  the most pervasive issues in the food 
industry today. However, little research has been conducted into the causes and 
consequences of activist demands on food companies. The growing level of engagement 
of food companies may be socially suboptimal inasmuch as activists likely represent the 
interests of only subsets of the  population (Lusk, 2003)  but yield disproportionate power 
to affect outcomes. 
The objective of this study is to examine the strategic interaction between activists 
and food companies in general. A sequential bargaining game is utilized to describe the 
relationship between threats of protest, compliance offers, and decisions to protest in a 
framework of incomplete information. That is, the food company is not a priori aware 
of the seriousness or the ability of an activist to protest once the threat of protest has 
been made (alternatively, there is no meaningful information in the signal given by a 
threat of  protest). This model provides insight into the optimal decisions when an 
activist should threaten protest and when the food company should comply, and there- 
fore identifies critical areas of data needs and future study. 
Conceptual Model 
Game Description 
We apply a stylized game theory model of sequential bargaining to the strategic inter- 
action between food companies and activists. This model is adapted from a class of 
models of frivolous lawsuits (Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985;  Bebchuk, 1984;  Katz, 1990). 
Bebchuk is perhaps the most prominent example. However, Bebchuk's  analysis con- 
siders only the defendant's (company's) decision to offer settlement, not the plaintiff s 
(activist's) decision to file suit. Clearly, the activist's decision of whether to engage a food 
company is also of  interest. Ignoring this decision leads to two important limitations. 
First, it  ignores the potential signal sent to the food company by the threat of protest by 
the activist (Katz, 1990). However, if it is costless to make threats, this consideration 
is not relevant. Second, the decision to make a threat of protest depends on the expecta- 
tion about the food firm's decision to offer compliance. 
Assume an activist group (or even an individual) has at  least the potential of protest- 
ing a food company in an attempt to get the food company to change current behavior. 
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the food company a priori. In  terms of capability, the activist must be able to inflict eco- 
nomic damage on the food company by protesting. For example, the activist is capable 
if it  can secure advertising  thorough contributions of members and  if it  has a grass-roots 
network of people willing to protest in different areas. Thus, the real question for the 
activist is whether it is serious about protesting. By  contrast, a lone individual or 
ordinary consumer may be very serious about protesting, but incapable of  inflicting 
economic damage on the food company. This distinction is a bit nebulous. However, 
consider that it is relatively easy for McDonalds to obse~e  the financial resources of 
PETA, but  it  is not easy to determine  whether PETA is  willing to devote sufficient 
resources to any particular cause. Consequently, while inferences can be made about 
capability, an  activist cannot reasonably protest every issue, so it  is  difficult to ascertain 
the activist's seriousness on any individual issue. For simplicity, from this point on, we 
assume the  activist is capable of inflicting damage, and thus the question is the serious- 
ness of the activist about attempting protest. 
Assume the food company encounters a variety of activist groups, but does not know 
which of  these groups is serious about protesting on a particular issue. It would be 
analogous to say that the food company is facing an  individual activist group, but does 
not know its type. This formulation of the problem leads to a view that  these encounters 
are a form of strategic interaction with incomplete information. The activist is attempt- 
ing to change corporate behavior in a manner consistent with the activist's beliefs. The 
food company is attempting to formulate a strategy for reacting to these activists when 
the true intentions of the activist are unknown.' 
The bargaining relationship has four sequential steps. First, the food company faces 
a random activist group, which is either serious or not serious (the state  of nature)  about 
inflicting economic damage through protests according  to a commonly known probability 
distribution. Second, the activist chooses whether to threaten protest or not to threaten. 
This choice is dependent on if, and to what extent, the  food company is willing to comply 
with the wishes of  the activist and the size of  economic damage caused to the food 
company if a protest ensues, thus endogenizing the activist's decision. Third, the food 
company will make a take-it-or-leave-it  offer of compliance,  which is the cost of the  level 
of compliance the food company chooses to offer.2  The food company cannot distinguish 
between a serious and non-serious activist. Finally, the activist chooses whether to accept 
the offer or to protest. 
Definitions of Variables 
The food company faces an  activist with an  unknown type, but a commonly known 
probability of being serious (figure  Thus, the activist is of two types-serious  and 
It is assumed there are no reputation effects here. The food company is encountering this activist for the "first  time," or, 
more precisely, has limited information about the type of activist. We  abstract from the dynamics of repeated interactions 
here for clarity in understanding  the nature ofthe problem. However, we return to the implications  of reputation effects later 
in the paper. 
'  Restricting this relationship to a single offer is a bit confining as the food company and the activist may negotiate to 
arrive at a final settlement. However, this simpler framework is more analytically tractable and provides sufficient detail 
for the problem. 
The presentation here is a bit non-standard  for a game theory model. We  present the model in this fashion to highlight 
the logical sequence of events in the context of the problem. A 'condensedn version of the normal form game is presented in 
the appendix. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Activist Group 
I Threaten  Threaten 
t 
............................... 
Food Firm Offers Some 
Level of Compliance, C  t 
I 
Protest 
Figure 1. Sequential bargaining extensive form game, 
activist vs. food company 
non-serious4-with  the prior probability of  being serious specified as: p,  E  [O, 11.  The 
economic damage or lost sales that can be inflicted by a serious protestor is assumed to 
be equal to E. The activist is not interested in economic damage per se, but in animal 
welfare, for example, which has an  economic or monetary value. For convenience,  we as- 
sume the  value of increased animal welfare to the activist is equal to E as  well, although 
these two measures do not necessarily need to be equal.5  The likelihood that  the activist, 
through protesting, can inflict E on the  food company is given by A E (0,  meaning the 
expected value of protest is  3LE. Because not all protests resonate with consumers, there 
is only some probability of  success (A) in inflicting some damage. 
The cost of protest for the activist is t, and the cost of  the food company defending 
itself with advertisements, etc., is k. Additionally, k can be thought of  as lost brand 
equity, goodwill, etc., as a result of  the protest. In either case, k is in addition to 3LE 
which arises from the protest with a probability 1. In addition to t, the activist has a 
cost, f,  which is the cost of making the threat (e.g., some fxed costs of operation, mock 
It  is possible to use a continuous distribution of types, but the results are qualitatively the same and the analytical model 
much more complicated. 
An assumption of inequality between the economic damage and the benefits to the activist of increased animal welfare 
has no real impact on the game. One can simply assume the utility of the activist is an  increasing function ofE. We abstract 
from that possibility here to maintain clarity of  presentation. 
'  In reality, k  6 [O, 11, so that k  can take on the limiting values of 0  or 1. However, if the food company is completely certain 
the activist cannot inflict any economic damage (k  = O), or completely sure the activist will inflict economic damage (k  = 11, 
the decision of the firm  is certain. Therefore, we are only interested in the cases where 0 < k  < 1. Hudson and Lusk  Activists and Corporate Behavior in Food Industries  83 
commercials that can be shown to food company officials). Once the threat is made, f is 
sunk and does not affect the decision of whether to protest. 
The net expected gain, or payoff, to the activist for protesting if the activist is serious 
is  3LE - t, while the net expected cost to the food company if the activist is serious and 
protests is  3LE +  k.7  The activist chooses a strategy that  maximizes its  return (gain)  from 
protest given the strategies of the food company. The food company attempts to mini- 
mize its expenditure given the activist's strategies and the food company's prior belief 
of  whether the activist is serious (p,). The payoffs to both the activist and the food 
company are shown in figure 1  (denoted by activist, food company). 
Third-Stage  Analysis 
Optimal solutions in a sequential bargaining model are derived by reasoning backward 
from the end nodes in figure 1  to derive the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies. In 
this case, the activist must choose between the food company's offer, C, or proceeding 
to protest the food company. A non-serious activist could obtain (a)  some compliance 
level, C, by accepting the offer; (b) -t by rejecting the offer and proceeding to protest; or 
(c) zero if the compliance offer is refused  and the activist chooses not to protest. 
Likewise, a serious activist could obtain (a)  some compliance level, C, by accepting the 
offer from the  food company; (b)  3LE - t by rejecting the offer;8  or (c) zero by rejecting the 
compliance offer and choosing not to protest. 
Thus, the serious activist would only accept an offer C from the food company if C 2 
3LE - t. When the serious activist is indifferent, it is assumed the serious activist would 
choose to accept the compliance offer. By contrast, a non-serious activist would accept 
any positive offer but would never actually protest. It follows that the food company 
will always offer either zero or C* = 3LE - t, depending on the food company's estimate 
(belief)  of the  probability the activist is serious-which  can be established, for example, 
by the size of the activist's budget, how many issues in which the activist is currently 
engaged, or the dispersion/concentration and size of the activist's group membership. 
Denote asp, the probability a protest will ensue, given that a threat has been made 
(or the posterior probability of  seriousness). The value ofp, depends on the prior prob- 
ability of being serious (p,) and  the  probability a non-serious activist will make a protest 
threat (q). Serious activists will always threaten protest because their payoff is at  least 
3LE - t - f, which is strictly positive (if not, no party would ever threaten protest). By 
Bayes' rule, the posterior probability of seriousness (p,) is designated by: 
where q, p,, andp, all range from 0 to 1. As q moves from 0 to 1,  the value ofp, ranges 
from 1  top,. If there is no chance a non-serious activist would threaten protest (q = 01, 
thenp, = 1,  implying the food company is completely certain that the activist will protest. 
There may be some economic benefits to compliance, such as increases in brand equity. Here, this would only serve to 
reduce the compliance costs, C,  or the expected economic damage from protest, AlC +  k, but would not change the analytical 
results. If the economic benefits exceeded the costs of compliance, the company would simply choose to comply (or would 
implement the change prior to a threat of protest). 
Recall that f is sunk ifa threat is  made, so it affects total payoffs but does not affect the payoff if choosing between a 
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This is an extreme case, however, and the outcome under such a scenario  is not particu- 
larly interesting. Rather, we are interested in the cases where 0 < q < 1. 
Second-Stage  Analysis 
The food company, then, has the choice of  offering C* to all activists, or offering zero 
and being protested by only those activists who are serious. Given the cost of  protest 
(3LE + k), the food company will strictly prefer to offer C*  if the expected cost of  compli- 
ance (m  - t) is less than the expected cost of enduring protest, p,(m + k). Rearranging 
this inequality and equating it at  the margin yields the posterior probability threshold: 
If the posterior probability of  seriousness (p,) is less than the threshold value, the food 
company will prefer to allow the activist to protest. Alternatively, if the posterior proba- 
bility is greater than the threshold, the food company will make a compliance offer, C*. 
If the posterior probability and threshold are equal, the food company is indifferent. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the magnitude of  A and the posterior proba- 
bility threshold (pi),  holding the ratio of total protest costs to economic impacts constant 
[(t + k)IE in figure 2). If the food company believes the probability that a protest will be 
successful is small (A is small), the posterior probability threshold will be small. As the 
expected probability of protest success increases, the posterior probability increases as 
well. When the economic impacts of  protest are  large relative to total protest costs (0.25, 
for example, in figure 21, the threshold probability is larger given a value for A than when 
the costs of  protest become larger relative to economic impacts (0.33 and 0.50 in the 
figure) for the same value of  A. This result suggests the ratio of costs to economic impacts 
has an important role in the posterior probability in addition to the beliefs of  the food 
company about the probability of  a successful protest. 
Given equation (2),  the optimal strategies for the food company can now be defined by 
a single variable, @,  which denotes the probability that the food company will offer C*. 
Ifp, <pf,  then @ = 0. Ifp, >pf,  then @ = 1. If the food company is indifferent (p, 
@ can take on any value between 0 and 1. Examining the non-serious activist's deci- 
sion regarding the threats to protest (q), the expected net return from protest is 
@(AE  - t) - f, because the activist must spend f to make the threat of  protest and has 
@ probability of  getting AE  - t from the threat. Therefore, the threshold for the proba- 
bility of  an offer equal to C* is: 
If + >  +*,  the food company would be offering compliance at a probability higher than 
the optimal strategy. This choice makes threats of  protest more attractive, and the 
non-serious activist would threaten protest with a probability q = 1  (or p, =  p, ).'  If the 
food company offers C* with a probability less than @*,  the probability of  compliance 
offers would be lower than optimal. Thus, protest threats would not be attractive and 
The decision variable here is  q. The impacts of the value of q on the posterior probability (p,)  are shown to illustrate the 
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Probability of  Protest Success 
Figure 2. Posterior probability of seriousness across perceived 
probability of protest success (ratio of total protest cost to economic 
impact of protest held constant) 
the non-serious activist would threaten protest with probability q = 0 (orp, = 1).  Finally, 
if  @ = @*,  the non-serious activist would be indifferent to threats of  protest and will 
choose any value of  q E (0, I), or pl E [p,, 11. 
Rearranging the definition for pf,  it can be shown that the threshold value for q is 
given by: 
Equation (4) states that if non-serious activists threaten protests with a probability 
greater than q*,  the posterior probability of  seriousness will be less thanp; and the food 
company would prefer to let the activist protest, and vice versa. Intuitively, this means 
that as  the probability of  a non-serious  activist threatening protest exceeds the threshold 
value, the food company will perceive more non-serious activists than it is willing to 
tolerate, and will be less likely to make compliance offers. 
First-Stage Analysis and Equilibrium 
If the prior probability of  being a serious activist is high (p, > pf  ), the food company 
would strictly prefer to offer all activists C*. Intuitively, this means that if the prior 
probability of being a serious activist is high (or the proportion of  serious activists a food 
company faces is high), the food company would prefer to offer all activists C* rather 
than face the high probability of protest. This choice reduces the almost certain loss of 
t + k if the probability of seriousness is high. The perverse outcome of this equilibrium 
is that, given a high probability of seriousness, all non-serious activists would threaten 
protest and would earn a surplus (surplus  in this context means the non-serious  activist 86  April2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
receives a compliance offer, which is surely accepted, when the activist was unwilling 
to engage in a protest to achieve its goal). Specifically, in a world where most activists 
are  serious, non-serious activists free-ride on the  credible threats of serious activists and 
earn a rent equal to  - t - f. 
The more interesting situation is  when the  prior probability is  less than  the  threshold 
value. Ifp,  there is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium whereby: (a)  all serious 
activists will threaten protest; (b) some, but not all, non-serious activists will threaten 
protest; and (c) some non-serious activists will receive positive compliance offers while 
others drop their threats, and some serious activists fail to receive a compliance offer 
and are forced to protest. 
Consider the separating equilibria if p, <  and @ > 4'.  The return to threatening 
protest is strictly positive for the non-serious activist, giving an optimal response of 
q = 1  andp, =p,. In this case, the food company's best response is @ = 0, which cannot 
be an equilibrium because it contradicts the equilibrium strategy of the activist. Like- 
wise, if @ <  @*, the non-serious activist's return to threatening protest is strictly negative, 
so that this activist's best response is q = 0 andp, = 1. In this case, the food company's 
best response is  @ = 1,  which cannot be an  equilibrium because it  contradicts the  optimal 
activist strategy. 
There is, however, a pooling equilibrium. Because the food company is indifferent 
about offering compliance whenp,  and the non-serious activist is  indifferent when 
@ = @*, these are the best responses to each other and therefore constitute a stable 
equilibrium. This equilibrium is stable under a dynamic adjustment process which 
mimics competitive  behavior. If too many non-serious activists threaten protest, the  food 
company will never offer compliance. Non-serious activists will exit the game until the 
food company is willing to comply with some positive probability. If too few non-serious 
activists threaten protest, the food company will always offer compliance. This will 
induce entry of non-serious activists until the food company is willing to allow some 
activists to protest without offering compliance.1° 
Comparative Statics 
Posterior Probability 
In equilibrium, the threshold proportion of  activists who are serious (pi) does not 
depend on the prior probability of seriousness (p,) or the cost of making threats (f  1.'' 
However, differentiating equation (2) with respect to expected payoffs (ax)  yields: 
* 
ap1  -  1  ax-t 
2 0,  aax  ax+k  (~+k)~ 
suggesting that  as  the  expected payoff increases, the  threshold proportion of serious 
activists will increase as  well (this result is supported by figure 2). If AE  is viewed as 
10 If the prior probability (po)  is exactly equal to the threshold value (p;),  a continuum ofknife-edge equilibria exist, with 
@ taking on values in the interval I@',  11. In all such equilibria, all potential non-serious activists will threaten protest be- 
cause, ifthey did not, the food company would strictly prefer to offer compliance and threatening protest would be profitable. 
l1 This is determined by taking the derivative of the threshold equation with respect to the stated variables. Hudson and Lusk  Activists and Corporate Behavior in Food Industries  87 
the increase in animal welfare, for example, an  increase in expected animal  welfare 
decreases the relative importance of protest cost to the activist (i.e., AE  becomes large 
relative to t). This, in turn, increases the required compliance level, C,  to avoid protest. 
To illustrate, assume PETA perceives the benefit to animal welfare from expanding 
chicken pen size to be $1  million. McDonalds offers a level of compliance that achieves 
some, but not all, of PETA's goals at a cost of $50,000. Now, if the perceived benefits to 
animal welfare were to increase to $100 million, would PETA be just as inclined to 
accept the $50,000 ~ffer?'~Alternatively,  increases in the expected payoff imply the food 
company must be more certain the activist is serious (pi) before offering compliance. By 
analogy, if PETA claims it will protest if McDonalds does not implement a $1 million 
improvement  to pen size, would McDonalds' threshold probability of seriousness for that 
threat be the same as if the claimed costs were $100 million assuming the same defense 
costs? 
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to the activist's protest cost, t, yields: 
which implies higher protest costs lead to a smaller threshold probability of  serious 
activists, and means serious activists will take lower offers of compliance in the begin- 
ning to avoid incurring the cost of protest. The intuition behind this finding is simple. 
If the cost of  protest increases, the activist will be willing to accept a lower cost of 
compliance in the beginning. The food company will be more willing to offer a lower level 
of  compliance, attracting more non-serious activists into the game. Thus, increasing 
protest costs attracts non-serious activists. Interestingly, this finding may explain why 
activist groups prefer to rely heavily on volunteers. Keeping protest costs low simul- 
taneously deters entry of  non-serious activists and increases equilibrium compliance 
offer amounts. 
Likewise, differentiating equation (2)  with respect to the food company's costs associ- 
ated with protest, k, yields: 
suggesting an increase in the food company's expected cost of  defending itself against 
protest will yield an increase in the proportion of  non-serious activists (or decrease in 
the posterior threshold for compliance). The same logic applies here: the increased 
expected cost (k) makes enduring protest less palatable for the food company, thereby 
increasing the desire to initially offer compliance. This desire attracts more non-serious 
activists into the game. Thus, economizing on expected defense costs would deter entry 
of  non-serious activists. 
l2 There are, of course, extreme cases where the protestor will perceive the benefits to be infinite (lexicographic pref- 
erences), and will accept nothing short of the complete abolition of the corporate behavior (or corporate bankruptcy). We 
recognize this possibility, but do not explicitly address it in this paper. 88  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Probability of  Compliance Offers 
The threshold value for a compliance offer (C*, a*)  does not depend on the prior prob- 
ability of being serious or on the expected protest cost for the food company. However, 
differentiating a*  with respect to protest cost of the activist yields: 
indicating that increases in the protest cost of  the serious activist will increase the 
probability of a compliance offer. An increase in protest costs decreases the attractive- 
ness of protest to the serious activist, thereby lowering the required compliance offer 
from the  food company to get the  activist to accept. Differentiating a*  with respect to the 
expected effect of protest, M,  yields: 
suggesting  increases in the  size of the expected effect of protest will decrease the  thresh- 
old probability of a compliance offer. Increases in the expected impact of protest make 
protest more attractive, and therefore increase the probability of protest. 
Shifting Costs 
Suppose the  food company requires proof of the activist's claim before a compliance offer 
is  forthcoming (e.g., the  food company requires the activist to provide proof that smaller 
pens actually damage the welfare of the chicken). The purpose of such a requirement 
would be to reduce incentives for non-serious activists to threaten protest. This require- 
ment would be analogous to increasing the proportion of protest costs incurred prior to 
making a threat of protest (i.e., raising f and lowering t by the same amount). Based on 
the  discussion above, raising f has no impact on the posterior probability of seriousness, 
but decreasing t increases the threshold probability of seriousness (p;). The net result 
is a decrease in non-serious threats. Thus, an effective strategy for food companies is to 
require substantiation  of the claims of the activist before making offers. The more of the 
cost that can be shifted to the activist, the more certain the food company is of  the 
activist's seriousness. At the same time, a strategy by the activist would be to increase 
the amount of evidence provided a priori, leading to a greater probability of compliance 
offers. 
Reputation Effects 
The model above presents a general picture of the  interrelationship between a potential 
activist and a food company, highlighting the trade-offs among the magnitude of eco- 
nomic costs for the food firm, protest costs, and the proportions of  serious and non- 
serious activists. The model does not, however, consider reputation effects (or repeated 
games). For example, it is not likely reasonable to assume PETA's  reputation had no 
impact on McDonalds' decision to comply. From the  food company's perspective, reputa- 
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always protesting for certain causes. In this case, the reputation of  the activist for 
protesting enters the prior probability of an activist being serious (p,), such that  p,(r), 
where r is the reputation of the activist-i.e.,  the strength of the reputation influences 
the prior probability of seriousness.13 
For example, assume an activist has a reputation for generally following through on 
threats of  protest. In this case, the food company is reasonably sure the activist is 
serious, meaningp, is  high. Ifp, is sufficiently high such thatp, >pi, the food company 
will always offer C*. Thus, a reputation for protesting will always increase the proba- 
bility of a compliance offer, other things equal. By contrast, a reputation for "bluffing" 
will lowerp,, whereby, other things equal, an activist who "bluffs" too often will be less 
likely to receive offers of compliance.14 
Another means by which reputation can enter the problem is through the potential 
efficacy of protest, A.  Past history provides some indication of an activist's efficacy in 
protesting so that  A(e), where e denotes efficacy, can be viewed as  the impact of potential 
efficacy on A.  Thus, an activist with a reputation for being an effective protestor will 
likely generate a higher expected value of A,  consequently increasing the expected cost 
of protest for the food firm (AE  + k). Increases in the efficacy of the activist therefore 
increase the expected cost of protest, thereby increasing the probability of a compliance 
offer from the food firm. 
Certainly, both forms of reputation effects can enter the decision-making process. 
However, they need not be mutually exclusive. For example, an activist may have a 
reputation for making false threats, but have a reputation for being highly successful 
when it does protest. This situation would complicate the process for the food firm. 
Nevertheless, intuition suggests there are dominant strategies activists could employ 
to preclude sending mixed signals. Activist groups would be best served by carefully 
selecting causes so that: (a)  once a threat of  protest is made, they are able to follow 
through with the protest if no compliance offer is extended, and (b)  they have a plan to 
maximize the effectiveness of any protest activity.15  Both of these strategies will maxi- 
mize a compliance offer. 
Discussion and  Examples 
The PETAMcDonalds scenario alluded to earlier provides an  interesting  context for this 
problem, both for the overall model structure as  well as the dynamic issues related to 
the bargaining relationship. In 1999, PETA announced a publicity campaign, using 
bumper stickers, t-shirts, and billboards with a slaughtered cow's head associated with 
slogans such as "Do you want fries with that?" or "McDonalds: Cruelty to go" (Barisic, 
1999).  This "threat" was intended as  a signal to McDonalds and represented an attempt 
l3 There are polar cases where the activist has a reputation for never protesting or always protesting. The case where the 
activist does not protest is not particularly interesting because the food firm  would never offer compliance. However, if an 
activist has a reputation for always protesting, the firm still has to decide whether to offer compliance based on the value 
of LJ3  + k, which is, at  least in part, dependent on the probability of success of  protest, 1. 
This latter point raises an  interesting side issue of  an  equilibrium amount of "bluffing" on the part of the activist. While 
not developed here, it  is reasonable to expect that activists would develop a sub-game solution for optimal bl&g  to achieve 
their overall goals at the least cost. 
l6 Part of the effectiveness  of  a protest relates to how the issue resonates with the consuming  public. An activist may have 
an effective strategy for implementing a protest, but if no one in the public arena expresses any interest, the likely size of 
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to gain reforms in animal handling procedures. Spokespersons for McDonalds initially 
stated they believed the campaign to be tasteless and maintained it  would not have the 
intended effect with consumers (seemingly indicating they thought the probability of 
protest success, A,  would be small). Shortly thereafter, however, McDonalds announced 
new standards for the treatment of laying hens (Mann, 2000). 
While this issue may not seem logical at  first, a closer examination adds some insight. 
Given that  McDonalds offered compliance,  then the  previous model suggests the compli- 
ance offer (C*)  is equal to the expected impact of the protest (hE  - t).  Assume the new 
requirements on laying hens increase egg costs by $0.04/dozen (Smith, 20011, resulting 
in an annual increase in cost to McDonalds of $10.5 million.16  Also assume McDonalds 
estimates that a protest would result in a decrease in net income of 2%, or $32 million. 
Given a protest cost of $500,000 (the amount PETA spent on anti-cruelty activities in 
2001), this means McDonalds only needs to perceive that PETA has a 32.8% chance at 
success with the protest to result in a compliance offer. Because the compliance costs 
were low relative to the expected impact of protest, McDonalds needed to perceive only 
a modest chance of success before agreeing to comply. Compare this to a situation  where 
McDonalds anticipated that a protest would only decrease net income by 1%. Here, 
McDonalds would need to perceive PETA had a nearly 66% chance of  success before 
compliance would be offered. 
At the other extreme, Greenpeace (2001)  threatened NovartidGerber with protest over 
the existence of genetically modified soybeans in their baby food. The cost of identity 
preservation and monitoring can be substantial and increase exponentially as  tolerance 
levels become more stringent (Kalaitzandonakes, 2003), suggesting the  expected impact 
of protest must be large to induce compliance. In this case, Novartis did not comply, 
resulting in a protest at  the Novartis headquarters in Switzerland. Novartis ultimately 
agreed to investigate claims of contamination with genetically modified soy in baby food 
plants, but did not offer substantial compliance otherwise. 
In terms of reputation effects, the PETA example above provides ample evidence of 
the effects of reputation. Immediately after the McDonalds engagement, PETA subse- 
quently engaged Burger King and Wendy's, both of which altered behavior in a manner 
consistent with McDonalds. However, reputation serves to alter perceptions ofthe prior 
probability on the  activist, but cannot completely  override perceived cost considerations 
or perceptions of protest success, as may have been the case in the Greenpeace engage- 
ment. 
These real-world cases do serve to highlight some potential strategies arising from 
the  model. First, it  is  likely an activist would prefer to choose an  issue where the compli- 
ance cost is relatively small compared to perceived economic costs of protest, so that the 
corporation would only need to perceive a small chance of protest success in order to 
offer compliance. This appears to be the strategy employed by PETA. By contrast, the 
potential compliance costs for Novartis were large. As the model predicts, increases in 
compliance costs result in a lower probability of a compliance offer. This finding suggests 
an optimal strategy by the activist for securing a compliance offer is to minimize the 
magnitude of compliance costs, which can likely be achieved by limiting the protest 
threat to a well-defined, small issue. 
l6 This value is derived by assuming that each McDonalds in the United States (12,000 stores) sells, on average, 60 dozen 
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Conclusions 
This paper presents a sequential bargaining game between activists and a corporate 
operator. The model focuses on the  willingness or ability of an  activist to follow through 
with a protest once a threat is made, and the corporation's optimal response to an  activist 
with an unknown probability of protest once the threat of protest is made. The model 
demonstrates that there are situations when the corporate entity would always acquiesce 
to the demands of activists and activists would always protest. However, the model also 
shows there are conditions when some activists will make threats, but not follow 
through, and some situations when corporations will allow activists to protest without 
seriously offering to comply with their wishes. This model has the advantage of being 
able to document the  strategic interaction  between activists and corporations and arrive 
at  a reasonable set of solutions which seem to mimic reality. 
The results of the model suggest that, ceteris paribus, both increases in the cost of 
protest to the activist and the corporation will increase the probability of false threats 
from non-serious activists. By contrast, the probability of a false threat declines with 
increases in the expected payoff (protest impact or animal welfare increase). Thus, as 
the economic consequences of protest increase, we expect to see  fewer false protest 
threats. Alternatively, as  the cost of protest or defense increases, more non-serious acti- 
vist groups are expected to emerge. 
Increases in the  cost ofprotest increase the  likelihood a compliance offer will be made. 
However, this also means that the level of compliance to be achieved will be lower as 
well. At the same time, the probability of a compliance offer declines as  the economic 
consequences of the protest (or improvements in animal welfare) increase. This finding 
may explain why companies are relatively accommodating when the economic conse- 
quences of compliance are  relatively low, but become more resistant to compliance when 
the costs increase, even though the potential economic consequences of non-compliance 
increase as  well. 
Assume the actual animal welfare enhancements, for example, can be achieved so that 
losses to the corporation are gains by society. The existence of  non-serious activists, 
however, has two economic costs. The first is the expected cost of non-credible threats by 
non-serious activists, qf. Second, there is the economic cost of protests which are required 
because, in equilibrium, some serious activists are not offered compliance and are forced 
to protest. Relaxing the assumption of  correspondence between social value and cost 
complicates this issue significantly. Specifically, the social benefits of increased animal 
welfare may be concentrated on a relatively few animal rights advocates where the cost 
is  borne by a broad consuming  public. These distributional aspects are  not addressed here. 
We have also abstracted from the possibility that corporations may, in fact, receive 
economic benefits from compliance. This possibility does not change the structure of the 
game, however. Rather, this possibility opens the  door for inclusion ofthese  impacts into 
the corporation's optimal strategy. 
Our model provides some indications of important data and analysis needs for empi- 
rical investigation of the costs and benefits of these activist engagements. First, some 
investigation into how and what issues activists choose to engage is  needed. This research 
includes what issues are chosen and how these groups go about formulating their 
expected values of protest (i.e., how do they determine the value of the issue under 
question?). Second, how corporations assess both the  probabilities of protest by activists 
and the likely economic impacts of protest need attention. Finally, the distribution of 92  April2004  Journal ofAgricultura1  and Resource Economics 
benefits and costs of protest require examination. While public policy is not likely to 
intervene on the freedom of speech of protestors, knowledge of the distributional impacts 
of these activities is necessary to understand how these impacts will shape the future 
of our food distribution system. 
Future research may explore two potential routes of inquiry. First, the comparative 
statics arising from the model could be tested experimentally. An experimenter could 
devise a bargaining game where payoffs were established based on the structure of the 
game. To introduce uncertainty (especially the probabilities of  successful protest), a 
lottery could be used to determine the final outcome of the protest should that be the 
choice of the respondents. Alternatively, a meta-analysis of news stories on activist- 
corporate engagement could be used to establish the marginal effects of activist size, 
budget, etc., and the expected economic impact of  compliance/non-compliance  on the 
probabilities of protest/compliance. While this latter approach is more indirect relative 
to the conceptual model, it  would provide evidence as  to the appropriateness of the 
theoretical model predictions and variables of interest. 
[Received  May 2003;Jinal revision received September 2003.1 
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Appendix: 
"Condensed" Version of the Normal Form Game 
In the game between the activist and the food company, there are two types of activists-serious  and 
non-serious-denoted by the subscript i E Is, nj. The strategy of the activist is given by the triplet (qi, 
ri,  y,), where q, is the probability of threatening protest (at a cost f ), ri is the probability of  accepting a 
compliance offer from the food company of  C*  = M - t, and yi is the probability of accepting zero from 
the food company. The strategy of the firm is denoted by 4,  which represents the probability of offering 
a compliance offer equal to C*, and the probability of offering zero is given by (1  -4). 
Reasoning backward from the end nodes in  text figure 1  (third-stage analysis), both the serious and 
non-serious activist would accept a compliance offer of C*, so that ri  = 1  for both types of activists. If no 
compliance was offered by the food company (4  = O), the non-serious activist would always choose to 
accept the zero offer and not protest (or y,  = 1). However, the serious activist could always receive 
positive benefit from protest (or LE - t - f ), and would therefore reject the zero offer and proceed to 
protest (or y, = 0). 
In the second stage, note that indifference of the firm between offering and not offering compliance 
is given by: 
*  m-t 
PI=  m. 
Given that  p, is the firm's prior belief that an activist is serious, and given that non-serious activists 
will threaten protest with probability q,,  the posterior probability of  a serious activist for the firm 
following Bayes' rule is: 
Given (A2), the firm's indifference can be rewritten as: 
Ifpo  = 1, or if q,  = 0, the firm is not indifferent, and therefore would offer compliance with 4 = 1. This 
cannot be an equilibrium because if the firm always offers compliance, it will attract non-serious 
activists to threaten protest. If, how ever,^, = 0, the firm is not indifferent and would offer compliance 
with 4 = 0. This cannot be an equilibrium either, because all serious activists would protest. Thus, the 
only equilibrium is where 4 E (0,l). This depends on the choice of  the non-serious activist being 
indifferent between threatening and not threatening protest, or q,  E  (0, I), which requires: 
For (A4) to be true, 4 must be strictly between 0 and 1. Thus, the equilibrium found above satisfies this 
condition. We conclude, therefore, that in equilibrium: (a) all serious activists will threaten protest; 
(b)  some, but not all, non-serious activists will threaten protest; (c) some, but not all, serious activists 
will receive a compliance offer while some will protest; and (d) some non-serious activists will receive 
compliance offers. 